Chapter VIII

Chapter VIII: Kennedy’s Contacts with the German Embassy

‘Well, old boy, I may not last long over here, but it is going to be fast and furious while it’s on,’ wrote Kennedy to his friend Jimmy Roosevelt, the President’s son and adviser, on the morrow of his arrival in London.[1] His start was just so. He’d already been welcomed by Viscount Astor as he disembarked at Plymouth. Then on 1 March 1938 he arrived in London. Next day he met the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax. The Prime Minister received him on 4 March. He presented his credentials to King George VI on 8 March. Two days later, he met Winston Churchill. On 18 March he made a speech to the Pilgrims Society and on 22 March he received Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador, whom he had already approached.[2]

There is evidence that Kennedy also contacted Joachim von Ribbentrop, still German Ambassador at the time of his arrival, at a very early stage. Ernst Woermann, who had succeeded Ernst von Weizsäcker as Under-Secretary of State, mentioned this when he wrote to Theodor Kordt, Chargé d’Affaires at the German Embassy in London, on 12 August. Von Dirksen, Ribbentrop’s successor as Ambassador, had previously conveyed Kennedy’s desire to visit Germany: Woermann pointed out that at the outset of his tour Kennedy had said that he would like to pay a visit to Germany, and had been given a positive response by von Ribbentrop.[3] After the invasion of Austria, however, von Ribbentrop advanced to become German Foreign Minister.[4] The Embassy was initially headed as Chargé d’Affaires by Woermann himself, and then after his promotion by Theodor Kordt. The new German Ambassador, Herbert von Dirksen, paid his first call on Halifax on 3 May. It was only on 31 May 1938 that von Dirksen for the first time mentioned the name Kennedy in a letter to Under-Secretary von Weizsäcker, ending:

‘Finally, I should like to mention a matter for which I am in no way responsible.’ For the umpteenth time, Kennedy the American Ambassador had spoken to him and stressed his wish to help improve German-American relationships. Von Dirksen continued: ‘He intends to make a study trip to Germany; next time he is in Washington, he also wishes to speak to President Roosevelt about the complex of European questions. It emerged from his utterances that he does not limit his office to Britain, but was charged with the entire European situation. In speaking with Mr Kennedy, I have hitherto spoken in the terms given to me in Berlin…’ He had learnt from Kennedy, said von Dirksen, that he would shortly be travelling to Washington and wished to see him, von Dirksen, beforehand so as to appear before Roosevelt in the sense mentioned. Von Dirksen said that he would be happy to avail himself of this opportunity and so he requested that he be sent a few thoughts that he could give the US Ambassador to take with him to Washington.’[5] Von Weizsäcker responded on 3 June:

‘I had already heard from Woermann that Kennedy had made a good impression on the gentlemen of our Embassy and that his personality outruns the limitations of the USA’s usual representatives…’ He added that he too thought that the good relations between the two Ambassadors ‘could also be usefully directed towards improving German-American relations ….’ Von Weizsäcker went on to list the points that von Dirksen should mention during the discussion – expressly, however, as his own, in order not to upset ‘the Ambassador here, Wilson’. Seen as important were ‘the Führer’s peace policy’, the ‘rampant press propaganda in the USA’, speeches by some Cabinet members that by no means aimed for neutrality, and on the other hand, German efforts to tame the ‘American-German Volksbund’ and the German desire for the conclusion as soon as possible of a trade agreement similar to those signed in recent with countries inside and outside Europe. Generally, von Dirksen should stress that ‘to your certain knowledge the government of the Third Reich set the greatest possible store on an improvement of the relations between the two great countries, who can adduce so many common shared points of contact.’[6]

Von Dirksen met Kennedy on 13 June, reporting the same day on the interview. Kennedy initially raised the problem of helium supplies.[7] He then made it clear that he would wish to give Roosevelt, especially, a thorough briefing. ‘Should he not believe that an improvement in Europe can be achieved’, he would be resigning his appointment he. He was convinced, however, ‘that the United States must come to have friendly relations with Germany.’ Generally, Kennedy was ‘immersed in his position, he said that neither Secretary Hull nor any of the other ministers or influential people could shake his position. The only one that he had to recognize as his superior was President Roosevelt.’ Roosevelt was not against Germany, indeed wished for friendly relations with Germany, it was just that so far nobody had arrived from Europe with a good word for today’s Germany and its government. ‘Most of them feared the Jews and dared not say anything good about Germany…’ Kennedy had then mentioned that he had heard from all manner of people ‘that the present government had done a great deal for Germany and the German people is satisfied’ Colonel Lindbergh had made a great impression on him and had ‘spoken of Germany in extremely friendly terms.’ He (Dirksen) had stated that any kind of visit by American personalities would be welcome and had advised Kennedy to go to Germany himself. ‘He appeared to favour this in principal, but – as in a previous case – was doubtful whether he would receive permission. The general public would in that case immediately reach the conclusion that with a trip by Kennedy, Roosevelt was pursuing specific ends.’ After Kennedy had expressed a measure of understanding for the ‘Jewish question’, he had then come to speak of the German-American relationship, which was basically not so bad. Yet in the event of a war one would probably nevertheless be on Britain’s side, even if there was general criticism that the British did not wish to repay their debts arising from World War I. On ‘satisfactorily friendly contacts’ between dictatorial and democratic countries, Kennedy had endorsed the view that democratically governed states, and especially the USA, could not reject an accommodation and negotiations with the totalitarian states. At the same time he confirmed that ‘an understanding with Germany, especially, was something very close to Chamberlain’s heart.’ It was also important for Kennedy to know more of about the Führer’s aims; and also whether Germany was not doing any propaganda in South America. On the other hand, Kennedy had repeatedly commented ‘that Germany must also have a free hand for trade towards the East and also South-East Europe.’ His verdict on the situation in the Soviet Union was extremely pessimistic.

Finally, von Dirksen said that he had gained the impression ‘that Kennedy was serious with his efforts to create a better atmosphere in German-American relations. I do not know what his inner motivation is, or what drives him – whether an idealistic conviction of the necessity of calming down the world in general, or tactical considerations affecting the next Presidential election, or personal political motives, to propel himself into the foreground. I do not believe this last one, Kennedy has made a good impression in the diplomatic corps and is certainly also regarded favourably by the government here.’ [8]

However informal the chat between the two may have been, and however painstakingly von Dirksen may have minuted this, it is important to take Kennedy’s comments, as reported, at their face value, to the extent that they reveal an irritation on the German side that obviously found difficulty initially in interpreting and assessing the US Ambassador’s unusually direct conduct. Even if von Weizsäcker initially reacted cautiously, it has to be said that – despite all the warnings from the German Embassy in Washington – Kennedy’s pressure made an impact in Berlin. If only hesitatingly, the German side was inclined to give Joseph Kennedy a hearing. The fact of the discussion itself and its content are of not inconsiderable importance in any subsequent consideration of the history of the preliminaries to World War II. Furthermore, it was not the last one. Until this day, however, the main American publications about Kennedy – and most recently David Nasaw – are inclined to play down the importance of this conversation. Michael Beschloss describes Kennedy’s worries about an outbreak of war over Czechoslovakia, continuing: ‘He resorted to another method of personal diplomacy that was bolder and more perilous. Hoping that better relations between America and Germany might help to prevent a European conflict, Kennedy began meeting quietly with the German ambassador to London, Herbert von Dirksen. According to von Dirksen`s cables to Berlin, Kennedy said that President Roosevelt was poorly advised on Germany, partly because of the influence of Jewish leaders in journalism and government. Some of Kennedy`s reported remarks amounted to acceptance of the German policy towards the Jews, and these could be only partially be explained by von Dirksen`s exaggerations and Kennedy`s tactic of feigning agreement with those he hoped to convince. Other of Kennedy`s comments may have convinced the German envoy that Chamberlain was eager for a German settlement, an impression which may have strengthened Hitler`s intransigence.’ [9]

One surprising interpretation is that on the one hand, von Dirksen had exaggerated, and on other, Kennedy had simulated understanding in order to be able to convey more convincingly that Chamberlain was intensively seeking an agreement with Germany, and precisely this could have caused Hitler’s intransigence? Bold logic.

Koskoff interpreted this differently: ‘Kennedy was generally more interested in winning the favour of his audience than convincing them to his point of view. Every audience got a slightly different shading that brought his arguments closer to what they wanted to hear: he told the British one thing, the American another; von Dirksen one thing, Chamberlain another; the Polish Ambassador one thing, the British another; Hull one thing, Halifax another. One of Kennedy`s friends attributed the content of the Dirksen dispatches to the fact that everyone always had the feeling that Kennedy agreed with them. Why? There was always the need for current approval.’ [10]

It would certainly not be appropriate to question Kennedy’s flexibility. Yet to imply lack of principles or arbitrariness, as Koskoff insinuates, would not do justice to Kennedy as a person. He may not have been the most eager churchgoer, but in word and deed he was a staunch Irish catholic – one needs only to recall his close relations with the hierarchy at the Vatican. Koskoff’s interpretation raises the question whether it actually needs to be accepted that as a rule the relevant political statement or action of Kennedy’s was not meant in the sense that it was perceived. In that case, it must be asked what deserved at all to be taken as true.

Swift writes that Kennedy had commented ‘complete poppycock’ on von Dirksen’s telegrams published after WWII, continuing: “Amanda Smith, the editor of her grandfather`s letters, would find ‘some muddling of the verifiable facts’ in von Dirksen`s account, and noted that Joe`s own diaries claimed that the German ambassador was not fluent in English. According to German foreign policy documents, von Dirksen`s own bosses at the foreign ministry discounted Kennedy’s comments, they saw them as casual remarks or an attempt at political advancement.”[11]

People in the German Foreign Office were undoubtedly sceptical about the US Ambassador’s statements and motives. Von Dirksen himself was obviously not certain how this outsize understanding on the part of his American colleague should be interpreted. Yet that certainly does not permit a conclusion that von Dirksen could have misunderstood his colleague. A trifle too transparently, an attempt is made to discredit reporting by the German ambassador that strove to be an objectively correct record.

Amanda Smith also wrote about this: “Of the events of the same day, by contrast, the American ambassador, pressed for time before his imminent departure for the United States, would only record that he had seen ‘the German ambassador, Oliver Stanley and Sir John Simon – an awfully crowded day’.” [12]

There is no reason to question this statement; yet it has to be asked what need there was for Kennedy, especially on such a strenuous day, to seek out the German Ambassador and chew the fat with him on American and German domestic politics and mutual relations between the two countries.

On the Kennedy-Dirksen interviews, Ralph deBedt points out that ‘the Embassy where Kennedy devoted more efforts than elsewhere was that of Nazi Germany. … During the spring months Kennedy sought to cultivate Dirksen at various social events where the two were thrown together. The American sought to convince his German colleague of his influence with Roosevelt and his interest in improving German-American relations.’ [13]

As time passed, on the Sudeten crisis DeBedt has Kennedy stepping up his efforts with von Dirksen: ‘Kennedy, intent upon averting friction with Germany through his personal diplomacy, more hotly pursued his suggestions to Dirksen.’ [14]

DeBedt then gives a very extensive record of the discussion with von Dirksen on 13 June, concluding: ‘Dirksen was puzzled whether personal political motives were behind the American’s outpourings, but was inclined to think rather that his idealistic desires for peace were the chief motivation.’[15]

Like DeBedt, Roger Cal William Bjerk has no doubts about the correctness of von Dirksen’s record. He comments: ‘Quite clearly Kennedy acted on his own initiative in opening a dialogue with Dirksen, for nowhere is there a hint that Washington authorized him to approach the German Ambassador. It may be surmised that Kennedy felt personal diplomacy was the necessity of the hour because of Washington`s failure to accurately perceive the acuteness of the European situation. Kennedy certainly felt that his concern was not duly appreciated by the Department of State, and he was convinced that the ‘career boys’ were ignorant of European affairs. Hence they failed to keep the President adequately informed. …’ [16]

Bjerk presumes that it was partly for this reason that Kennedy wished to return again to the States in June to give Roosevelt a clear picture of the European situation. Bjerk writes: ‘What really may have been at the bottom of Kennedy’s frustration was Roosevelt’s everlasting optimism which contrasted with Kennedy’s alarm and pessimism. If Kennedy detected Presidential buoyancy during their frequent transatlantic telephone conversations, he might well have concluded that the State Department was the culprit in blinding the President to a clear vision of things.’ [17]

Bjerk raises another point in connection with his comments on the Czechoslovakian crisis. He writes: ‘He (Kennedy) could not accept the analysis given him by the Soviet Ambassador to Britain, Ivan Maisky, whose interpretation of Central European affairs and the German problem were strikingly similar to Messersmith`s.’ [18] and continues:

“This put Kennedy out of step with Churchill`s ‘stop Hitler’ admonition which the Ambassador had heard again and again through formal and informal channels. One suspects that Kennedy looked upon people in Churchill`s camp as either war-mongers or deluded individuals beyond the pale of understanding the realities of Britain`s weakened military position compared to Germany.” [19]

David Nasaw writes: ‘When these transcripts were made public, Kennedy and his defenders would insist that Dirksen, new to the post and anxious to please his superiors in the Foreign Office, had grossly distorted his remarks. It is clear from the transcripts that Kennedy was doing his best to ingratiate himself with the German diplomats, as he did with all those he anticipated doing business with in the future. Still, while telling them what they wanted to hear about American Anti-Semitism and Jewish media dominance, he was not saying anything he did not believe to be true.’ [20]

Von Dirksen, 56, was an experienced diplomat of long service, appointed German Ambassador in Moscow by Stresemann, then in 1933 to Tokyo and 1938 to London. To suggest that he should have written something designed to please his superior, and moreover none other than Ribbentrop, whom he despised,[21] is certainly a bold assertion, all the more so as there is no indication of any occurrence that suggested he was currying favour. More convincing, by contrast, is the fact that in this case Kennedy was not saying something that he did not believe to be true. Yet how should one take the comment that he behaved trustingly with all those with whom he intended ‘to do business’? It can hardly be assumed that deals were meant in the commercial sense of the word. So what political business could Kennedy have meant?

The discussion of 13 June was continued on 20 July, after Kennedy’s return from the United States. On the same day von Dirksen reported to von Weizsäcker that Kennedy had initially spoken of the faltering US economy [22] and the necessity of a reorganization of the world economy, then turning to the ‘very significant deterioration’ in the mood towards Germany. The average American made Germany responsible for the general uncertainty in the world and the result was a growing enmity towards Germany. Roosevelt deliberated calmly and moderately, ‘He would be prepared to take up Germany’s claims against Britain and/or to to do everything that could calm things down’. Roosevelt’s thoughts were now dictated by his intention ‘in view of domestic political considerations, to complete great positive services before the end of his presidency.’ The United States and Britain found themselves similarly placed, since both ‘would need to have implemented the main points in their programmes within a year.’ [23]

In von Dirksen’s view, it emerged clearly from Kennedy’s comments that ‘the United States appear to themselves as Britain’s protectors and helpmates.’ So Chamberlain’s cabinet is receiving support and political backing for his desire for an accommodation with Germany – support that would in any case suffice to break the British opposition.’ Otherwise: ‘The United States and/or he himself will definitely see to it that the British cabinet makes a real effort in the sense desired by America’. Kennedy will immediately leave his post ‘if he is convinced that his mission in Europe remains fruitless.’ Von Dirksen then wrote that he had the outlined the current situation on the German-Czech problem, and they had then come to discuss Kennedy’s visit to Germany. Without some official pretext a visit would be impossible, said Kennedy, but he thought it conceivable that as the recently elected President of the International Wheat Conference[24] he could come to its next meeting in Berlin. ‘That would give him the opportunity for discussions and brief round trips. This is therefore a pending question, on which Kennedy awaits an answer,’ reported von Dirksen. Von Dirksen added that by comparison with their last talk, Kennedy seemed ‘in several respects to be more concerned and more pessimistic,’ then finally commenting that ‘Now as before, he made a good impression personally on me, and it became more obvious to me – something that I have meanwhile had confirmed by various people – that he is acting on behalf of Roosevelt, who needs to have world economic successes to show in his election campaign; as a secondary aim, perhaps Kennedy is reckoning with his own nomination as a presidential candidate.’[25]

Woermann replied to this letter on 12 August 1938. Among those with whom he discussed the matter had been Dieckhoff in Washington, who had initially expressed legal reservations. ‘These reservations were on the score that Kennedy’s assessment of the USA’s policy towards Germany was over-optimistic and that Kennedy could therefore arouse false impressions here. We then agreed with Mr Dieckhoff that this consideration could not be a reason for preventing Kennedy’s trip.’ However, Woermann subsequently explained that the wheat conference meeting might not take place at all. Counsellor Theodor Kordt, holding the fort at the Embassy for von Dirksen, who was on leave, was nevertheless requested to notify Kennedy ‘in a friendly manner’ that he would be ‘very welcome’ in connection with the upcoming conference, although it was not certain whether this would be held in September or October.[26]

As Chargé d’Affaires at German Embassy in London, on 12 September Theodor Kordt despatched a record of a conversation that von Selzam, the Minister, had had that day with Kennedy, who had explained the strongly anti-German mood in the USA. Yet this was unjustified, since Hitler had done fantastic things for Germany. Kennedy had displayed ‘an astonishing familiarity with achievements in Germany’ in his account. It was now up to Hitler whether chaos would ensue. If war did not result in connection with the Czechoslovakian question, then that would trigger a tremendous turnaround in public opinion throughout the world, particularly in the United States. His ideas in the social and economic field, for which Germany had him to thank to such an extraordinary extent, would be of formative influence in the economic build-up of the United States and economic cooperation between all countries. He repeated that he was firmly convinced of this.’[27]

This exaggerated way of expressing himself arouses misgivings and leads one to question what part Kordt and von Selzam were playing. It is impossible to go into that more deeply here. A future paper should aim to compare the situation of the working population in 1938 in the USA or Great Britain with its counterpart in Germany. For Kennedy, prosperity and low unemployment totals were the essential indicators of both the significance and the ability to persuade of a political system such as the one in Germany.

On 13 October von Dirksen called on the US Ambassador, reporting to Weizsäcker on the same day. Kennedy immediately reverted to his plan to visit Germany, stressing that he would also be happy to make this without any link to the wheat conference. He did not know how much longer he would be in London, ‘the presidential election campaign would soon be launched and for that he would probably have to move to the USA for some time’. ‘In December he would be travelling to the United States …for some months for the meetings of the House of Representatives…’ Kennedy therefore had in mind a visit in November. However, he would only embark on the visit provided that he could speak with the Führer.’ He was intending to explain to the Führer the situation in the United States in terms of both the economy and the way public opinion functions. Above all, his aim was to contribute towards a better understanding between the United States and Germany.’ He would then relate the experiences and impressions he had gained to Roosevelt, who was ‘a thoroughly reasonable and percipient man’ and indeed dependent on relevant facts. It was Kennedy’s impression that people sympathizing with Germany were not admitted into Roosevelt’s presence. He himself, however, had the President’s ear and showed sympathy and understanding for Germany; furthermore, he was not a career diplomat ‘and could therefore speak more frankly and uninhibitedly with Hitler and also Roosevelt than official persons.’ Kennedy regarded conclusion of a trade agreement and then also the setting of a new mark-dollar rate of exchange. No parliamentary decision was required for that, it could be solely regulated by the Treasury. However, he would find no understanding from Hull for his thoughts. One of the reasons why Kennedy felt that a discussion with the Führer would be useful was that from Chamberlain ‘he had heard a lot about his impressions during his negotiations in Germany. Chamberlain, above all had been convinced that the Führer was sincere and of good will and that he would always fulfil any obligations that he had taken on.’

Kennedy had then emphasized that in the critical days of the Sudeten crisis he had not only frequently called at the Foreign Office, but had been in close contact with the Cabinet Office. Asked once again, Kennedy had reiterated that a visit would be possible without there being any specific occasion for one. He would ‘collect President Roosevelt’s permission’ once he had the Führer’s agreement. Ambassador Wilson had welcomed the move. In conclusion, Kennedy had emphasized the necessity of disarmament, also the average American’s friendliness towards Germany and understanding for the German attitude towards the Jews.[28]

In this discussion too, Kennedy had had no hesitation in stressing his own special position in the Roosevelt Administration and his special closeness to President Roosevelt. As outlined above, Kennedy was convinced that he had a special part to play in United States foreign policy.

In his basically forthright and brief reply of 18 October, von Weizsäcker made it clear that Kennedy would be welcome at any time – whether or not the wheat conference took place. Kennedy should first of all collect the Presidential assent, however, the Office would then do the necessary to bring about an audience with the Führer.[29]

Kennedy’s understanding of his assignment and commencement of his duties also prompted him to try to establish his contacts with the Third Reich. He was not in the least bit bothered that this was really not part of his job. He had been the President’s official representative at the coronation of the Pope and as David Nasaw writes, ‘With Pacelli now pope and Galeazzi one of his chief advisers, Kennedy would become the de facto liaison between the pope and the president.’[30] That is the only way of understanding the way in which Kennedy intended to fill the post of Ambassador in London, among the US Administration’s most important ones abroad. In the same way as he had persuaded Roosevelt to welcome the Anglo-Italian Agreement against his own conviction and the mood in the country, and in similar circumstances to keep the country out of the Spanish Civil War – naturally always in cooperation with his isolationist friends and the at the time similarly inclined Roman Catholic leadership in the United States – he was also thinking of steering the Roosevelt Administration in the same direction on relations between the USA and the Third Reich. However, this was to be on condition that the Germans restricted their activities in South America, i.e. documented their willingness to accept the Monroe Doctrine.

His own momentum abruptly wrenched Kennedy out of this realm of exalted ideas. Kennedy had delivered his speech at the Navy League’s Annual Trafalgar Day Dinner. He was immediately the subject of angry commentaries in the US press. On 20 October von Dirksen reported that Kennedy had approached him at the memorial service for Lord Stanley, the Dominions Minister. Kennedy had reported that on account of the speech he had given a few days earlier to the Navy League, he had been heavily attacked in the American press: “he was accused of ‘going over to Hitler’. He was extremely indignant and felt that he would rather take his leave than allow his reasonable views to be dragged through the mire like this by a stupid press. Asked whether he had already received a reply from Roosevelt on his projected visit to Germany, he denied this, adding that now, after the speech, the reply would perhaps be a little while in coming.”[31]

With his letter to von Dirksen of 2 November 1938, Dieckhoff as German Ambassador in Washington brought his London colleague, also probably the German Foreign Office, down to earth: “I am happy to believe that Kennedy is honest,” he started his letter, continuing: “Although there are some indications that like most pure ‘politicians’, he thinks only of himself and with his visit to Germany wants to bring himself into a better position, in any case his argument that the President needs to better briefed on Germany is not valid.’ The President was perfectly well informed by his Ambassador in Berlin and also other sources. If he being unfriendly just now, that is because he wants to be, and not for lack of Information.’[32]

Dieckhoff’s opinion is more than plausible, although his assumption that Kennedy would come into a ‘better position’ through a visit to Germany is puzzling. Who in the USA would reward a visit of this kind? Isolationist groups, perhaps, and the Hearst press, unfortunately Dieckhoff made no further comment. On Kennedy, however, he emphasized his belief that ‘his influence with the President is not so great as it was a few months ago.’ Kennedy’s assessment of the situation in his country was completely wrong, as press, radio and film reports showed. These could hardly have been more hostile. ‘Even Mr Kennedy will be unable to alter that, even if he earnestly wishes to do so. US public opinion towards Germany cannot be remedied by small steps, but only if the major European powers join together in successfully building up Europe anew (sic)…’[33]

This was a far-sighted form of words but of no help in the current situation – and especially not because just at this point isolationists were engaged in a head-to-head race with interventionists. That would not necessarily have been of great importance if this controversy had not made an impact in the Democrat Party, i.e. Roosevelt’s party, thus jeopardizing its majority in Congress. It was these circumstances that made Joseph Kennedy feel so strong: He was behind Roosevelt, yet served the Isolationist camp. They were also responsible for Roosevelt’s often seemingly inconsequential foreign policy.[34]

The visit to the Third Reich no longer materialized, and to that extent Kennedy, by contrast with Lloyd-George, for example, was spared photographs showing him with the bosses of the Nazi regime that would have offered factual proof of his efforts. To that extent, Michael Beschloss may rightly be speaking of ‘quiet meetings’, since the only available sources are the German Embassy’s report from London to von Weizsäcker as Under-Secretary of State. One may deduce from the fact that far more than one discussion occurred between Kennedy and von Dirksen and that it was mainly always the same topics that were discussed, that the mood was neither a coincidence nor a one-off. Also, above all, that Kennedy’s interviews with von Dirksen had one clear objective: Arrangement of a meeting with the German leader. Finally, it is perhaps appropriate to remember Dieckhoff’s statement that ‘politicians’ first of all and primarily think of themselves, having an eye to their own advantage. With Kennedy, one could always and invariably be certain of that.

 

[1] Quotation from David Nasaw, ‘The Patriarch, the Remarkable Life and Turbulent Times of Joseph p. Kennedy’, New York, 2012, p. 287

[2] ‘Today I returned a visit to Kennedy, the new US-ambassador to Great Britain. He is quite a character: tall, strong, with red hair, energetic gesture, a loud voice, and booming infectious laughter – a real embodiment of the type of healthy and vigorous businessman, that is so abundant in the USA, a man without psychological complications and lofty dream.’ – ‘The Maisky Diaries, Red Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s 1932-43’, ed. by Gabriel Gorodetsky, New Haven and London, 2015.

[3] Woermann to Kordt, 12 August 1938 (translation), for original see PA AA, R 104981.

[4] It is curious that David Nasaw can describe a meeting between Kennedy and Ribbentrop: ‘After his June 10, 1938, meeting with Kennedy, Ribbentrop reported to Berlin that the two had discussed…’ David Nasaw, op.cit, p. 310. What Nasaw actually describes as the record of a discussion between Kennedy and Ribbentrop actually covers one between Kennedy and von Dirksen.

[5] 2369/494534-536 Dirksen to Under-Secretary von Weizsäcker, London, 31 May 1938; quoted from: ‘Files on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945) Vol. II’, Baden-Baden, p. 289/90.

[6] (Translation), for original see PA AA, R 29852, Fiche No. 1653

[7] Note: The Third Reich was dependent on helium from the USA, at that time the sole supplier of helium. A non-inflammable gas, helium was required for operating airships. Cf. Helmut Braun, “Das ‘Wundergas’ Helium, die US-amerikanische Innenpolitik and die German Zeppeline, (“The ‘miraculous gas’ helium, US domestic politics and the German Zeppelins”), in the Vierteljahreshefte for Zeitgeschichte 4/2005, p. 571

[8] (Translation), for original see PA AA, R 29852, Fiche No. 1654. Also interesting in this context is Keith Neilson’s contribution in ‘An Excellent ConningTower’. This reports Lord Tweedsmuir (John Buchan), Canada’s British Governor-General as telling Mackenzie King, the country’s Prime Minister in the summer of 1938, that he was impressed ‘with the sagacity and stability of both Neville (Chamberlain) and Halifax, the latter Eden`s successor as foreign secretary.’ Neilson continues: ‘He was also pleased that both men were ‘greatly impressed’ with the new American ambassador to Britain, Joseph Kennedy, ‘who has become an enthusiastic crusader on behalf of Britain’ … ” Keith Neilson: “John Buchan on the Fringes of Diplomacy, in “On the Fringes of Diplomacy” , ed. by John Fisher and Anthony Best, 2011, p. 262/263

[9] Michael Beschloss, op.cit, p. 164/165  

[10] David E. Koskoff, op.cit, p. 279

[11] Will Swift, a.a.O., p. 55

[12] Note: Amanda Smith, Ed, op.cit, S 232; Amanda Smith had been adopted by Jean Kennedy Smith, Joseph Kennedy’s youngest daughter.

[13] Ralph deBedt, op.cit, p. 60/61

[14] Op.cit, p. 61

[15] Op.cit, p. 62

[16] Carl William Bjerk, a.a.O., p. 81

[17] Op.cit, p. 81

[18] George Messersmith, Assistant Secretary in the State Department 1937–40.

[19] Carl William Bjerk, a.a.O., p. 75; Keith Neilson writes: “Tweedsmuir, Canada’s British Governor-General, was still in London during the Munich crisis of September 1938. He supported Neville Chamberlain`s action. ‘I cannot understand the criticism which seems to be rampant at home about Neville’s policy’, he wrote in the aftermath. ‘Do the donkeys ever consider what the alternative was?’ … Tweedsmuir had confidence that the Prime Minister, ‘was pursuing the sensible policy of avoiding war…’ Keith Neilson, op.cit, p. 263

[20] David Nasaw, op.cit, p. 311

[21] Cf. also Herbert von Dirksen, ‘Moscow, Tokyo, London’, Rottweil, 1949, p. 205 and p. 224

[22] Keith Neilson writes: “By spring of that year (1938) Tweedsmuir was convinced that the United States was ‘heading straight … for the 1933 situation, and the President seems to have no policy that I can detect.’ His American friends and correspondents provided ‘nothing than jeremiads’. Here Tweedsmuir`s views were at one with those of Chamberlain, who told the governor-general that Roosevelt ‘seems to be rapidly accumulating unpopularity and I am afraid the growing hostility of Congress will cripple him considerably.’” Keith Neilson, op.cit, p. 261/262  

[23] In the USA, not only were the mid-term elections coming up in November, but Roosevelt faced the last two years of his term, with the final year occupied with the primaries for the choice of the parties’ Presidential candidates. On London, Louise Grace Shaw wrote that ‘With support growing for action to be taken against the German dictator, and with consideration of the general election to be held in the autumn (1939) Chamberlain decided to act.” C.f Louise Grace Shaw, ‘The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union 1937 – 39’, London, 2003, p. 101/102

[24] Chaired by Richard Bedford Bennett, the Canadian Prime Minister, the first ‘Four-Day International Wheat Conference’ opened on 21 August 1933. The aim was to limit production volumes, primarily by limiting area under cultivation. C.f Gregory P. Marchildon, “The Impact of the Great Depression on the Global Wheat Trade’ – Draft prepared for the workshop ‘Unpeacable Exchange -Trade and Conflict in the Global Economy 1000 – 2000’”, University of Lisbon, 16–17 July 2010

[25] (Translation), for original see PA AA, R 104981

[26] (Translation), for original see PA AA, R 104981

[27] Files on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D (1937–45) Vol. II, No. 460, p. 592

[28] (Translation), for original see PA AA, R 29852, Fiche No. 1654; Hugh Robert Wilson, in 1938 the US Ambassador in Berlin.

[29] (Translation), for original see PA AA R 29852, Fiche No. 1654.

[30] David Nasaw, a.a.O., p. 374; basically, the significance of the Vatican should not be under-estimated; at Franco’s suggestion, for instance, the German Foreign Office was giving some thought to how Roosevelt’s re-election could be prevented. With its telegram of 19 August 1939, it requested the German Legation to the Holy See to consider whether and how the Vatican could influence American Catholics. C.f ‘Files on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D (1937-45) Vol. VII, No. 129’, p. 114/115

[31] (Translation), for original see PA AA, R 29852 File No. 1654

[32] PA AA, R 104982, Vol. 8

[33] PA AA, R 104982, Vol. 8

[34] J. Simon Rofe writes: ‘… that the President of the United States had at his disposal a relative lack of foreign policy tools, and that he had to consider moves that stood little chance of outright success, reflects the nonentangling views of the American people.’ C.f.: J. Simon Rofe, ‘Franklin Roosevelt`s Foreign Policy’, p. 28